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Abstract. This paper proposes a tax mechanism modelled for water extraction in a river 
system with upstream and downstream farmers. The tax mechanism is based on the 
regulator’s own estimation of aggregate extraction and for that reason the tax addresses 
the problem of asymmetric information. It is demonstrated that the tax mechanism 
ensures approximately correct marginal extraction incentives for the individual farmer. 
Consequently, it is concluded that the tax mechanism proposed here has a practical 
application. 
 








Water scarcity and population pressures are increasing. In 2030, 47% of the world’s population 
will be living in areas of high water stress (OECD 2008). To avoid potential water conflicts 
caused by increased competition, more countries are focusing on means of regulating water 
extraction (Johansson 2000). The request for water regulation especially arises in river basins 
with upstream-downstream communities, where the downstream community are exposed to an 
insufficient amount of water due to upstream extraction. Because the downstream community 
cannot force the upstream community to save water, or exclude the upstream community from 
extracting the water, the upstream community have no incentive to take into account the 
negative effects they impose on downstream communities as a result of their extraction. In the 
Chiang Mai Province in Northern Thailand, tensions occurred between upstream and 
downstream communities, as a consequence of water scarcity in the dry season. Downstream 
farmers blamed the upstream farmers for increasing their extraction to irrigate orchards, leaving 
very little water for the downstream community (Hares 2009).  
In this paper we address problems of water extraction such as those faced by the Chiang Mai 
Province. Considering various pricing mechanisms
1, the methods of water pricing can be 
classified into volumetric pricing, non-volumetric pricing, and market-based methods 
(Johansson 2000; Dinar and Subramanian, 1997; Tsur and Dinar 1997). The volumetric pricing 
methods use various kinds of charges for irrigation water. These methods are typically based on 
the consumption of actual quantities of water and hence require a metering water facility. Non-
volumetric methods can be used if the information concerning extraction quantities is 
inadequate. These methods charge for irrigation water based on a per output basis, a per input 
basis, or a per area basis. Finally, market-based mechanisms rely on market pressures and well-
defined water rights to determine the irrigation water price.  
                                                            
1 Other methods such as common governance, subsidies etc. can be used as well. See Sampath (1992) for an 
overview of irrigation pricing in developing countries. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 2 
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However, when choosing a regulation method it is important to take the costs of implementing 
the regulation system into account, e.g. the metering system, as well as the problem of 
asymmetric information. In the case of water pricing, asymmetric information often appears in 
two forms: The farmer, typically, has complete information on his water extraction, but this 
information is private and unavailable to the regulator: Moreover, water production 
technologies, which depend on farmer characteristics, are unobserved by the regulator. Smith 
and Tsur (1997) use mechanism design theory to propose a water-pricing scheme, which 
depends only on observable outputs to deal with the problem of unobserved individual water 
intake, and the high costs of implementing a metering system. Similarly, Loehman and Dinar 
(1994) suggest a mechanism design based on a cooperative solution. 
Pricing methods based on inputs or outputs may, however, distort input-output decisions (Tsur 
2000). Therefore, in this paper a tax based on volumetric pricing
2 is suggested. The tax is based 
on aggregate consumption, and therefore requires a limited amount of information, taking into 
account the typical problem of asymmetric information. Moreover, suggesting a tax to regulate 
the problem between the upstream and downstream community, it is possible to internalise the 
negative externality, which the upstream community impose on the downstream community, 
thus, potentially avoiding tensions between the two.  
The conditions for the tax mechanism are described in Section 2; In Section 3 the tax 
mechanism is set up; and in Section 4 the pros and cons of the tax are discussed and  the 
conclusion is presented. 
 
2. The extraction problem 
Consider our river system with two communities; an upstream (   and a downstream ( ). The 
individual upstream farmer,   1 ,…,  , and the individual downstream farmer,     1,…, , 
                                                            
2 The tax mechanism is a revised version of Hansen’s (1998) mechanism, applied to water extraction. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 2 
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extract an amount of water,   (       
 ,   
  ), which for the two communities can be summarised 
into aggregate water extraction,      ∑   
 
  , and      ∑   
 
  . Due to limited information, the 
regulator has no information regarding the individual’s level of water extraction,   
  and   
 . 
However, by relatively simple hydrological calculations, the regulator is able to observe how 
much water the upstream community extracts in total,      ∑   
 
  . 
During each rainy season, a certain amount of water,  , is added to the system. The amount of 
water available for extraction,  , depends on whether one is located upstream or downstream. 
For upstream farmers, this relation is assumed to be exogenous, while for downstream farmers, 
the relation depends on the amount of water left in the system after upstream extraction. An 
amount of water cannot, however, be used for extraction. This is the water base,        ,   , 
whereby the water base influences the amount of water available for extraction. Without the 
water base, the river is unable to renew itself and will dry out. Thus, it is assumed that  ′     
0. Consequently, in a steady-state equilibrium
3, the following resource restrictions are 
applicable:  
(1)                and                   
Formulating the resource restriction in this way means that if       , there is no water for 
downstream users. In the following, however, only the situation in which        is considered 
since, in most cases, it seems unlikely that upstream users will extract all the water available. 
We assume that the extraction cost,         ,    , is a function of water extraction,  , and of the 
water base,  , with   /     0 and   /     0. The cost functions vary between the individual 
farmers, reflecting variations in technology and ease of water extraction. Thus, extraction costs 
for the individual upstream farmer and the individual downstream farmer can be expressed as:  
                                                            
3 It is possible to generalise the model and analysis to a dynamic problem, but since dynamic problems often result in 
an analysis of steady-state, the problem is simplified from the beginning and the whole problem is analysed in a 
steady-state setting. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 2 
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(2)    
      
    
 ,   , and   
      
    
 ,    
It is assumed that the individual farmer knows his own cost function, but that the individual 
farmer’s cost functions are unknown to the regulator.  
Defining the gross benefits of water for the individual farmer   
  and   
 , it is assumed that the 
gross benefit is a function of water extraction,     , with  ′      0,   ′′      0 (see for 
example Neher 1990). Consequently, the net benefit for farmer   and farmer  , respectively, is: 
(3)    
      
    
      
    
 ,   , and   
      
    
      
    
 ,    
Hence, the optimisation problems for farmer   and farmer  , respectively, are: 
 (4a)  max  
   
      
    
      
    
 ,      
s.t.                0  
and  
(4b)    max  
    
    
    
      
    
 ,      
s.t.                    0  
This problem can be solved with a standard Lagrange method. The first-order conditions with 
respect to   
  and   
  are:  
(5a)  
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
      
   0  and  
(5b)  
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
      
   0  
  
  and   
  are the user costs of the water base, that is,   
  and   
  denote the marginal increase in 
total extraction costs. 
Having that   ′     0 , it is possible to reformulate the resource restrictions in such a way so 
that the steady-state water base relates to the amount of water available, and hence aggregated 
extractions (  . That is: FOI Working Paper 2011 / 2 
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       (6a)                                
       (6b)            
                                
And because  ′     0  it follows that   /     0 
By substituting (6a) and (6b) into (4a) and (4b), respectively, we get the following maximisation 
problem for the regulator: 
        (7)      max  
 ,  
  ∑    
    
       
    
 ,              
            
   ∑    
    
      
     
 ,                   
             
This gives the following first-order conditions with respect to   
  and   
 : 
(8a)  
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
    ∑
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
    ∑
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
   0  and  
(8b)  
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
    ∑
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
   0  
and having a number of farmers extracting water at the same time, it is assumed that individual 
water extraction   is not fully observed. Thus, it is assumed that the individual farmer has Nash-
Cournot conjectures (
  
    1   . This means that equation (8a) and (8b) can be reduced to: 
        (9a)  
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
    ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
    ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
   0  and  
       (9b)   
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
    ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
   0    
In equation (9a),  ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
  , is the marginal increase in water costs, which upstream users 
impose on other upstream farmers through their aggregated extraction. A similar condition is 
found for downstream farmers,  ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
  . These elements are denoted as an “internal FOI Working Paper 2011 / 2 
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externality”. Moreover, for upstream farmers,  ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
  , is the marginal increase in 
extraction costs, which upstream farmers impose on downstream farmers through their 
aggregated extraction, hence an “external externality” or “upstream-downstream externality”. 
Comparing equation (9) with equation (5), it is apparent that the elements;  ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
   and 
 ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
  , and  ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
    are similar to   
  and   
 . And because upstream farmers do 
not take the costs they impose on downstream farmers into account, regulation must 
consequently compensate for this. Moreover, regulation must compensate for the condition that 
farmers within the same community do not take into account the costs they impose on each 
other
4, in order to avoid the over-utilisation of the resource.  
 
3. Imposing a regulatory tax  
A regulatory tax is suggested, which is a function of water extraction, due to the situation in 
which very little water is left for the downstream farmers, because upstream farmers do not take 
into account that they impose costs on downstream farmers through extraction. In fact, two 
types of taxes are suggested in order to capture the internal externality within the communities 
and the external externality between the communities: That is an internal tax (IT) aimed at 
regulating the internal externality;             
 ,    
  , and an external tax (ET), to regulate the 
external externality;             
 ,    
  . The external tax is, naturally, only valid for upstream 
farmers. Consequently, in the steady-state equilibrium, the individual upstream and downstream 
farmer, respectively, faces the following profit maximisation problem (defined in equation (4)): 
(10a)   max  
    
    
       
    
 ,                
    
        
    
    
                                                            
4 The simple version is considered here in which farmers within the community extract water from the same 
waterhole. A more correct version would also involve an upstream-downstream condition within the individual 
communities, meaning that a number of waterholes along the river exist from which the farmers extract water. This 
specification is rather easy to implement in the model although not necessary for the objective. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 2 
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(10b)   max  
      
    
      
     
 ,                       
    
    
This gives the following first-order profit maximisation condition for the two groups of farmers: 
 (11a)  
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
     
     
 
   
   
     
 
   
   0  and 
(11b)  
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
     
     
 
   
   0  
In the case without regulation, 
   
    
   
    0 , the individual farmer sets his extraction of water 
to maximise profit without taking into account the fact that he affects the other farmers’ 
extraction costs. Thus, the free-rider problem occurs and the resource is over-utilised. Efficiency 
requires that the farmers take into account the resource constraint effect on the costs of their 
own community, ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
   and ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
  , but also that the upstream farmers take into 
account the resource constraint effect of the costs of the downstream community, ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
  .  
Because equation (11) is the objective first-order condition for profit maximisation, it is unclear 
to what extent the farmers realise that their own extraction affects the common costs, that is the 
costs they impose on other farmers within their community. In most cases, the extent to which 
farmers realise that their own extraction affects the common costs may depend on the 
functioning of the community. In order to capture variations in community cultures, a 
parameter,  ,        
 ,   
  , is introduced, affecting the internal externality:    
  ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
and    
  ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
   for the upstream and downstream farmers, respectively, where   may 
attain values between 0 and 1. It is argued that if   1  the community is fully able to 
internalise the costs they impose on other farmers through extraction. If, however,   0 , the 
community is unable to internalise the costs they impose on the others through extraction. 
Irrespective of the value of  , the resource will, however, be over-utilised. This is because the FOI Working Paper 2011 / 2 
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upstream farmers do not take the increased downstream extraction costs into account. 
Consequently, a regulatory tax is needed. 
 
3.1 Information assumptions 
Consider the information upon which the regulator can base the taxes. The regulator has no 
information about the individual cost functions,   · , or about individual water extractions,   . 
The regulator is, however, able to estimate the aggregate cost functions for the upstream and 
downstream water users, respectively, ∑   
   
   ·  and ∑   
   
   · . In most cases, the regulator has 
an idea of the aggregate costs, based on knowledge of average extraction costs and the number 
of users. Similarly, the regulator has an idea of the aggregated benefit functions   
  · and   
  ·  
based on knowledge of crops grown in the irrigated areas. It is, moreover, assumed that the 
regulator is able to estimate how much water enters the system,  , and how much water 
upstream users leave for downstream extraction. Therefore, the regulator can estimate the 
aggregated water extraction (H) by measuring    ·  and    · . Given knowledge of ∑   
   
   ·  
and ∑   
   
   · ,    · , and    ·  5, the regulator can solve the following problem: 
 (12)    max     
        ∑   
   
     ,              
        
                          ∑   
   
     ,                   
Equation (12) implies that the optimal aggregate steady-state extraction,   , is known by the 
regulator, where      ∑   
    
      ∑   
    




5 Gross benefits,   
  and   
 , are not assumed to differ significantly between the two communities. The reason is that 




3.2 The Tax Scheme 
Now imposing an internal and an external tax, a tax based on aggregate cost functions and 
measured aggregate water extraction is suggested, thereby avoiding the problem of asymmetric 
information. Thus, the internal tax to be paid by the individual water user ( , ) to capture the 
internal externality is: 
       (13a)       
    ∑   
   
      ,        and     
    ∑   
   
      ,        
And the external tax to be paid by the individual upstream farmer ( ) to capture the external 
externality is:  
(13b)       
    ∑   
   
      ,        
Forming the taxes this way means that the taxes are a function of optimal aggregate extraction 
calculated by the regulator,   , and actual aggregate extraction measured by the regulator. 
Basing the taxes on the aggregate steady-state extractions means that the taxes in optimum are 
equal to the total extraction costs.  
 
3.3 Nash Equilibrium under Tax Regulation 
Having now two types of taxes, as defined in equation (13), the individual farmer and his 
maximisation problem is considered once more. By substituting the taxes for the individual 
farmer’s maximisation problem (equation (4)), the farmer  ,  now solves the following problem 
depending on whether he is an upstream or a downstream farmer: 
        (14a)   max  
    
    
       
    
 ,           ∑   
   
      ,        – 
                                     ∑   
   




        (14b)  max  
    
    
      
     
 ,                   
                                     ∑   
   
      ,           
The respective first-order profit maximisation condition for the individual upstream water user 
and downstream farmer is: 
(15a)  
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
        
  ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
    ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
   and  
 (15b) 
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
        
  ∑
   
 
   
   
   
 
    0 
And the individual farmer is able to solve this problem as he knows his own cost function and is 
informed of the tax formula. 
By comparing equation (15) in which the farmer optimises his water extraction under the 
proposed tax scheme, with equation (9), the optimal water extraction, we see that the upstream 
farmer takes the full upstream-downstream externality into account. Hence, the tax we have 
suggested corrects for the upstream-downstream externality. Moreover, the internal tax is able 
to capture the internal externality, if   is known. The tax results in correct marginal incentives if 
  0 , but “over-corrects” if   0 . The tax also corrects for the external water base effect of 
the farmers’ water extraction on other farmers within the community, ∑
   
  
  
  , as it should, but 
also for the perceived part of the water base effect on farmer   himself, 
   
  
  
  , which is an 
internal effect that farmer   already takes into account. Moreover, an additional problem arises if 
  0 . In this case, it is not possible to argue that the individual users have Nash-Cournot 
conjectures. One way to handle this condition is to decrease the internal tax, thereby moving 
closer to the optimal water extraction level.  
If a situation in which   is unknown is considered instead, it becomes more problematic for the 
regulator to set a tax which neither over, nor under-corrects the internal externality. If the FOI Working Paper 2011 / 2 
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internal tax is set too low, the upstream farmers will extract too much water, affecting 
downstream conditions negatively. However, if the internal tax is set too high, upstream 
conditions are affected negatively. For this reason it may be beneficial for the regulator to 
support the functioning of the community, e.g. by subsidising, providing technical aid or other 
methods, in order to improve the functioning of the tax system. Also, the regulator may invest in 
revealing costs and benefits by developing new technologies, or by implementing mechanism 
design tools. However, independent of the knowledge of the functioning of the communities, a 
tax is suggested which is able to incorporate the upstream-downstream externality, which is 
often the root of upstream-downstream tensions. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
A tax mechanism in which the regulator simply bases the tax on the aggregate water extraction 
is simple and cheap. This means that the tax mechanism can be functional in areas where 
volumetric pricing methods may be too expensive to implement. The paper is concluded with a 
discussion of the pros and cons of the mechanism, focusing on how the proposed tax 
mechanism will work in reality. 
First, in the paper we assume that the farmers have Nash-Cournot conjectures. Whether this is a 
reasonable assumption for all the farmers can be questioned, especially when considering the 
individual communities. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that that individual water 
extraction,   , is not fully observed between the two communities. Hence, Nash-Cournot 
conjectures between the communities can be assumed. Moreover, as the size of the communities 
increase, Nash-Cournot conjectures within the communities may become more reasonable. For 
this reason, Nash-Cournot conjectures may not be perfect, but can be rationalised. 
A second aspect to consider is information requirements. Often the farmer has private 
information which is unavailable to the regulator. In this situation, the tax mechanism gives rise FOI Working Paper 2011 / 2 
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to at least two requirements. Firstly, the regulator must have information about the amount of 
water entering the system (  . Although it can be difficult to collect precise figures, it is not 
impossible for the regulator to obtain such information through surveys. Moreover, this problem 
is similar to problems of information requirements in the case of quota, or self-governing 
regulation. Secondly, the tax mechanism does not work without reliable cost data. However, 
information about the individual’s cost function is not needed, in contrast to the mechanism 
proposed by Segerson (1988). The tax mechanism is functional when only information about 
the aggregate cost functions for the two groups of farmers is available. However, this can also 
be difficult for the regulator to collect, especially because farmers may underestimate their costs 
if they know the data will be used to calculate a tax. The information requirement for the tax 
mechanism proposed here is, however, similar to the requirement in the mechanism proposed by 
Hansen (1998). For this reason, it must be assumed that it is a general, but manageable, 
information problem. 
Thirdly, it is often mentioned that it is important that a tax mechanism secures a budget balance. 
A tax mechanism is of a budget-balancing type if the total payments equal the society’s value of 
conservation. The tax mechanism proposed here does not secure a budget balance and neither 
does the mechanism proposed by Segerson (1988). To solve non-point pollution problems, 
Xepapadeas (1991) proposes a random penalty mechanism which secures a budget balance. One 
might argue, however, that a budget balance is of less importance for the tax mechanism 
proposed in this paper, since we regulate water extraction from a river system in an area with 
limited resources for implementation. This means that water extraction by the individual farmer 
is expected to be small. Thereby, the total tax payment becomes small. For this reason, the 
possible “over correction” of the tax in monetary terms might be rather small, and therefore the 
aspect of budget balance might be minor in the case of the practical application of the proposed 
tax mechanism. Moreover, because in this case the focus is more towards regulation, a budget 
balance might be considered as being less important. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 2 
14 
 
Finally, it is assumed that the communities are able to handle the problem of the resource 
constraint within the communities. That is, they are able to allocate the tax payments among 
themselves, depending on the amount of water extracted, or other criteria, such as geographic 
location in the river system. This may, however, require a well functioning community, which 
underlines the argument about the importance of supporting the functioning of the individual 
communities. 
However, bearing in mind the listed potential problems, the suggested tax seems to have 
important applications as it takes care of two significant problems when farmers share a river, 
such as those in the Chiang Mai Province in Northern Thailand. First, it addresses the problem 
of asymmetric information, since only a minimum amount of information is required. Moreover, 
the information needed is aggregated, which is less expensive to collect than information on an 
individual level. Second, the tax regulates the negative externality, which upstream farmers 
impose on downstream farmers, allowing for internal regulation within the communities. 
Consequently, it is concluded that the tax mechanism proposed here has a practical application. 
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